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Communication Complexity of Cake Cutting∗
Simina Braˆnzei† Noam Nisan‡
Abstract
We study classic cake-cutting problems, but in discrete models rather than using infinite-
precision real values, specifically, focusing on their communication complexity. Using general
discrete simulations of classical infinite-precision protocols (Robertson-Webb and moving-
knife), we roughly partition the various fair-allocation problems into 3 classes: “easy” (con-
stant number of rounds of logarithmic many bits), “medium” (poly-logarithmic total com-
munication), and “hard”. Our main technical result concerns two of the “medium” problems
(perfect allocation for 2 players and equitable allocation for any number of players) which
we prove are not in the “easy” class. Our main open problem is to separate the “hard” from
the “medium” classes.
1 Introduction
The concept of dividing valuable resources in a way that is fair has a long history in economic
thinking and underpins the very notion of justice in society [Fol67, Raw71, Var74, Mou03]. An
instantiation of this challenge is the problem of allocating a set of goods—such as land, time,
mineral deposits, or an inheritance—among multiple participants with equal rights but distinct
interests. The model that encapsulates the pure fair division problem1 is due to Steinhaus
[Ste48] under the name of cake cutting. The “cake” is a metaphor for the collection of interest,
formally defined as the unit interval, while the value of each participant (player) for a piece of
cake is given by the integral of a private probability measure over that piece. The cake cutting
model can be seen as the limit of a discrete model of fair division—in which the players have
additive valuations over a finite set of indivisible goods—by letting the number of goods (i.e.
“atoms”) grow to infinity.
This model has given rise to a rich literature concerned with understanding what fairness
itself means and what procedures can materialize it [BT96, RW98, Pro13]. The outcome of a
protocol is an allocation, which is an assignment of (non-overlapping) pieces to the players, so
that each piece is a union of intervals and the whole cake is allocated. Four of the commonly
considered notions of fairness are proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability, and perfection. A
simple envy-free protocol is the Cut-and-Choose procedure for two players, Alice and Bob, in
which a mediator asks Alice to cut the cake in two pieces of equal value to her, after which Bob
is allowed to take his favorite while Alice is left with the remainder.
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Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 740282). The project was also supported
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Foundation (BSF) grant 2014389. Simina also acknowledges support from the I-CORE Program of the Planning
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1In economies with production, the participants may have different contributions to the product of society, so
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Moving beyond Cut-and-Choose, protocols for more players can get very complex and, in
fact, a central question in the cake cutting literature is that of computing fair allocations
despite the informational challenge of private preferences. The goal of a mediator (or center)
is to help the parties reach a fair solution, which in turn requires it to learn enough valuation
information. The existing cake cutting protocols are broadly classified in three categories as
follows. The largest class contains so called “discrete” protocols, which operate in a query
model (due to Robertson and Webb [RW98, WS07]), where the center can repeatedly ask the
players to make a cut or evaluate an existing piece. Despite the fact that the Robertson-Webb
(RW) query model is viewed as discrete in the cake cutting literature, it is an infinite precision
model, which is unavoidable for the purpose of computing exact solutions (or even approximate
ones for arbitrarily complex instances.) Continuous (moving knife) procedures generally involve
multiple knives sliding over the cake, with stopping conditions that signal the presence of a fair
allocation. In a companion paper [BN17] we formalize a general class of moving knife procedures
and prove that they can be approximately simulated by logarithmically many queries in the RW
model. Finally, direct revelation protocols were studied also in the context of mechanism design
[MT10, MN12, CLPP13, BM15], where the players directly submit their entire valuation to
the center, whose goal is to compute a fair allocation despite the strategic behavior of the
players. The positive results in the direct revelation model are either only for very restricted
preferences, such as piecewise uniform functions [CLPP13], or rely again on infinite precision
for general preferences [MT10].
In this paper we study the communication complexity [KN96, LS09] of cake cutting: we
assume that each player knows its own valuation function, and study the amount of communi-
cation that the players need to exchange (between themselves or with a mediator) in order to
find an ǫ-fair allocation, for various notions of fairness.
There are several motivations for studying the communication complexity of fair allocation
problems. First, it is natural to use discrete protocols for studying notions of complexity rather
than infinite-precision ones like the RW model, and communication complexity is the strogest,
most general, model that allows only discrete queries to each player’s valuation2. Second, we
will show that communication lower bounds also imply lower bounds not only in the RW model
but also in various moving-knife models, allowing us to utilize the strong tools already devel-
oped in the theory of communication complexity for proving results on cake cutting in other
models. Third, cake cutting problems seem to be interesting challenges from the point of view
of communication complexity: these problems have low non-deterministic communication com-
plexity3, and there are rather few such problems for which good deterministic or randomized
lower bounds are known (specifically [BR17, RW16] and Karchmer-Wigderson games [KW90].)
Since the existence proofs of fair allocations are based on fixed point theorems such as Sperner,
Brower, or Borsuk-Ulam [Ney46, Sim80, Str80, Alo87, Su99, DQS12, FRFGZ16, FRG18], their
study is a basic instance of understanding various “PPAD-like” classes [Pap94] in the commu-
nication complexity model. Finally, this work is part of the general thread of understanding
the communication complexity of economic problems, such as markets, auctions [NS06, BNS07,
DV13, DNO14, ANRW15, Ass17, BMW17], matchings [GNOR15], and voting [CS05].
It is clear that in discrete models such as communication complexity exact fairness is im-
possible to achieve and we thus focus on the approximate notion, ǫ-fairness. We note that
understanding ǫ-fairness is motivated by the fact that in reality the goods to be allocated are
rarely completely continuous but rather, at best, are fine enough so that a continuous model is
a good approximation. Similarly, in reality we do not need (or can really get) exact fairness,
2Any query that has k possible answers to the valuation of player i can be simulated in a communication
protocol by log
2
k bits of communication from player i.
3I.e. specifying a fair allocation requires a small number of bits, and its fairness can be easily verified.
2
but rather approximate fairness should suffice. It is thus interesting, from a complexity point of
view, to study the complexity of achieving various notions of fairness as a function of the desired
approximation parameter ǫ. While much previous work has studied the complexity of cake cut-
ting notions in terms of the number of players n [BT96, RW98, EP06b, WS07, Pro09, AM16],
recent work [CP12, PW17, BN17] started studying the dependence in terms of ǫ as well. In
this paper we will always treat n as a small fixed constant, and focus on the complexity in
terms of the desired approximation level ǫ. There does remain work in understanding the joint
dependence on both n and ǫ.
1.1 Our Results
We study both general notions of fairness and in particular the following four standard notions:
proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability, and perfection [RW98]:
Definition 1. An allocation A1 . . . An of the cake among players 1 . . . n, where each player i
receives piece Ai, is called:
• ǫ-proportional if for every i: vi(Ai) ≥ 1/n − ǫ.
• ǫ-envy-free if for every i, j: vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)− ǫ.
• ǫ-equitable if for every i, j: |vi(Ai)− vj(Aj)| ≤ ǫ.4
• ǫ-perfect if for every i, j: |vi(Aj)− 1/n| ≤ ǫ.
Our first contribution is a careful definition of the communication complexity model for cake
cutting. We observe for the problem to make sense we must have the following two features be
part of the setting: the valuations of the players must have bounded density (this is the correct
equivalent to the no-atoms assumption in the usual cake cutting model) and that the number
of cuts (pieces, intervals) in the produced allocation must be bounded.
Without bounded density, nothing can be done, as is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let ǫ0 = 1/3 be a constant approximation parameter. No finite discrete protocol
can output a ǫ0-proportional allocation between n = 2 players for all atom-less valuations (but
whose densities are not necessarily bounded). The same impossibility holds for every other
number of players n, ǫ < 1/2, and any other standard fairness criteria.
On the other hand, if the protocol is allowed to produce allocations with an unbounded
number of cuts then allocations that are ǫ-fair can be found with high probability without any
communication.
Proposition 2. For every n and ǫ, there exists a randomized protocol, with public coins, that
without any communication or queries produces with high probability an ǫ-perfect allocation with
at most O(ǫ−2) cuts. The protocol may be turned into one with private coins by adding a single
round of communication of O(log ǫ−1) bits. The same holds for any other standard fairness
criteria.
From this point on we will therefore assume valuations with bounded densities and protocols
that produce allocations with a bounded number of cuts.
Our second set of contributions is providing general simulation results that apply to a
rather general class of (abstract) fairness notions, including all those studied in the literature
4The equitability requirement is considered particularly relevant in situations of heightened conflict, such as
divorce settlements or war negotiations.
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(the formal requirement for such general fairness notions can be found in Section 2.1). We start
with a general simulation of the (infinite precision) RW model by the (discrete, finite precision)
communication model.
Theorem 1.1. Let M be any protocol in the RW model that makes at most r queries and
outputs F-fair allocations, where F is a fairness notion. Then there exists a communication
protocol Mǫ with r rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication each, such that Mǫ outputs
ǫ-F-fair allocations.
A more general class of protocols is that of moving knife protocols, in which “knives” are
continuously moved across the cake until some condition is met (perhaps in addition to RW
queries). In a companion paper [BN17] we defined a general class of such protocols that can be
approximately simulated in the RW model, and here we define an even more general class that
can be approximately simulated with small communication. All known moving-knife procedures
fall into this class, using a constant number of steps. While the formal definition is a bit
cumbersome, in an intuitive sense it captures protocols that rely on the simple intermediate
value theorem (rather than a “full-fledged” fixed point theorem.)
Theorem 1.2. Let M be any moving knife protocol that runs in constantly many steps and
outputs F-fair partitions. Then for every ǫ > 0, there is a communication protocol Mǫ that uses
O(log ǫ−1) rounds each with O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication and outputs ǫ-F-fair partitions.
For fairness notions for which no protocols are known in existing models, we still show that
a fair allocation can be found with nearly linear communication.
Proposition 3. For any fairness notion F (that is guaranteed to always exist and has at most
a constant C number of cuts), an ǫ-F-fair allocation can be found using a single round of
O(ǫ−1 log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
Armed with these general simulation results we get a high-level map of the communication
complexity of various notions of fairness. We qualitatively categorize the standard fairness
criteria in terms of their communication complexity into three categories: “Easy”, “Medium”,
and “Hard”. Let us discuss each of these categories.
Easy:
The first class of problems consists of fair division problems that have known bounded
protocols in the RW model, i.e. can be solved with a constant number of rounds of logarithmic
(or even poly-logarithmic) bits. Applying our simulation theorem to known protocols in the
RW model [AM16, EP84] we get:
Theorem 1.3. The following problems have communication protocols with a constant number
of rounds of communication of O(log ǫ−1) bits each round:
1. For any fixed number of players n, a connected ǫ-proportional allocation among n players.
2. For any fixed number of players n, for some constant C that depends on n, an ǫ-envy-free
allocation with at most C cuts.
We show that this upper bound is tight in a strong way:
Theorem 1.4. Every (deterministic or randomized) protocol for (not-necessarily connected)
ǫ-proportional allocation among any n ≥ 2 players requires Ω(log ǫ−1) bits of communication
(with no restriction on the number of rounds.)
4
Medium:
The second class corresponds to problems that have known moving-knife protocols: comput-
ing a connected equitable allocation between n = 2 players, an perfect allocation with two cuts
(the minimum possible) between n = 2 players, and a connected envy-free allocation among
n = 3 players. We show these problems have logarithmic or poly-logarithmic total communi-
cation complexity: equitable and envy-free can be solved approximately with O(log ǫ−1) bits,
perfect with O(log2 ǫ−1), and general moving knife protocols with polylog(ǫ−1).
Our main technical result is a lower bound that applies to the two player problems above
(i.e. perfect and equitable) showing that they are not in the “easy class” and thus separating
the “easy” and “medium” classes.
Our technical analysis of these problems proceeds by introducing a natural discrete commu-
nication problem that we call the “crossing problem”.
Definition 2. The general crossing(m) problem is the following: Alice gets a sequence of
integer numbers x0, x1, . . . , xm with 0 ≤ xi ≤ m for all i and similarly Bob gets a sequence of
integer numbers y0, y1, . . . , ym with 0 ≤ yi ≤ m for all i, and such that x0 ≤ y0 and xm ≥ ym.
Their goal is to find an index 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that either both xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi or that
both xi−1 ≥ yi−1 and xi ≤ yi.5
In the monotone variant, mon− crossing(m), Alice and Bob are also assured that 0 = x0 ≤
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xm = m and m = y0 ≥ y1 ≥ · · · ≥ ym = 0 and again need to find an index
1 ≤ i ≤ m such that xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi.
Our upper bounds on the communication complexity of the crossing problem are as follows.
Theorem 1.5. The deterministic communication complexity of crossing(m) is O(log2(m)).
The randomized communication complexity of crossing(m) is O(log(m) log log(m)).
Theorem 1.6. The (deterministic) communication complexity of the mon− crossing(m) prob-
lem is O(log(m)).
In terms of total communication we have a logarithmic lower bound, so closing the gap for
the general crossing problem remains an open problem. Our main technical result is a lower
bound that shows that even the monotone variant of the crossing problem cannot be solved
using a constant number of rounds of logarithmic many bits of communication each and thus
is not in the “easy” class described above. Our proof uses “round elimination” lemmas from
communication complexity [MNSW95, SV08].
Theorem 1.7. Any (deterministic or randomized) protocol that solves mon−crossing(m) using
rounds of communication of t-bits each (with logm ≤ t ≤ m) requires Ω(logm/ log t) rounds of
communication.
It turns out the the monotone crossing problem exactly captures the complexity of finding
a connected equitable allocation between n = 2 players, while the general crossing problem
captures exactly the complexity of finding a perfect allocation (with 2-cuts) between n = 2
players. The monotone variant also implies an upper bound for finding a connected envy-free
allocation among n = 3 players.
Corollary 1. The deterministic communication complexity of finding an ǫ-perfect allocation
with two cuts between n = 2 players is O(log2 ǫ−1). The randomized communication complexity
of this problem is O(log ǫ−1 log log ǫ−1).
5An even more difficult variant of this problem would insist that the output is the former rather than the
latter. This variant does not seem to correspond directly to any fair division problem so we will not name it. It
is worth noting that the protocol in the proof of theorem 5.1 solves this harder variant as well.
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Corollary 2. The deterministic communication complexity of finding a connected ǫ-equitable
allocation between n = 2 players and a connected ǫ-envy-free allocation among n = 3 players is
O(log ǫ−1).
Corollary 3. Any (deterministic or randomized) protocol for finding an ǫ-perfect allocation with
2-cuts between n = 2 players or for finding a connected ǫ-equitable allocation between n = 2
players using rounds of communication of polylog(ǫ−1)-bits each requires Ω(log ǫ−1/ log log ǫ−1)
rounds of communication.
In particular, this theorem implies nearly logarithmic lower bounds on the number of queries
in the RW model for these two problems. Comparing our result for equitability to the recent
lower bound of Ω(log ǫ−1/ log log ǫ−1) by [PW17] in the RW model, our result has two advan-
tages and one disadvantage. The first advantage is that the communication complexity model
is significantly stronger, and the second is that our lower bound applies also to randomized
protocols (with public coins and two-sided error). The disadvantage is that our lower bound is
only for connected allocations.6
We conjecture that the ǫ-equitable and ǫ-perfect allocation problems remain of “medium”
complexity (rather than “easy”) for any fixed constant number of cuts (that does not depend
on ǫ). Similarly we conjecture that for n = 3 players the envy-free problem with connected
pieces is not “easy”.
Hard:
The final class of problems are ones where reasonable protocols are not known. Our general
result above states that nearly linear (in ǫ−1) many bits of communication suffice for essentially
any fairness criteria. The main open problem left by this paper is to prove a separation between
the “medium class” and the “hard class”. I.e., to prove a super-logarithmic lower bound on
the communication complexity of some fairness criteria. This would in particular imply that
such a problem has no moving knife protocol for it (in a rather general class of moving knife
procedures), a type of result that is not known. Natural candidates for such problems are those
that have no known protocols for them:
1. An ǫ-perfect allocation among n ≥ 3 players and any (bounded) number of cuts.
2. A connected ǫ-envy-free allocation among n ≥ 4 players
2 Model and Preliminaries
We have a cake, represented by the interval [0, 1], and a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}. Each
player i has a value density function vi : [0, 1] → ℜ+. We denote the value of player i for any
interval [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] by vi([a, b]) =
∫ b
a vi(x) dx. The valuations are additive, so vi
(⋃m
j=1Xj
)
=∑m
j=1 vi(Xj) for any disjoint intervals X1, . . . ,Xm ⊆ [0, 1]. Note that, by definition, atoms are
worth zero, and w.l.o.g. the valuations are normalized so that vi([0, 1]) = 1 for each player i.
A piece of cake is a finite union of disjoint intervals. A piece is connected if it’s a single
interval. An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is a partition of the cake among the players, such that
each player i receives piece Ai, the pieces are disjoint, and
⋃
i∈N Ai = [0, 1].
7 An allocation A
6Notice however that as mentioned above if an arbitrary number of cuts is allowed (a finite number that may
depend on ǫ) then the lower bound is false in a very strong sense.
7Some works also consider the problem of fair division where cake can be discarded; see, e.g., [CLPP13, SHA16].
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has C cuts if C is the minimum number of cuts needed to demarcate A; e.g. the allocation
A = (A1, A2) where A1 = [0.3, 0.5] and A2 = [0, 0.3] ∪ [0.5, 1] has 2 cuts, at 0.3 and 0.5.8
We assume that the valuations are private information. We will always have
• Bounded density: For some fixed constantD (that may depend on n), for all 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1,
we have that vi([a, b]) ≤ D · (b− a).
A valuation vi is hungry if it has positive density everywhere: vi(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
2.1 Fairness Notions
Given player valuations v1 . . . vn, our goal is to partition the cake into pieces A1 . . . An in a way
that satisfies certain fairness criteria, at least approximately. The following are some of the
most commonly considered notions of fairness:
• ǫ-proportionality: For all i: vi(Ai) ≥ 1/n − ǫ.
• ǫ-envy-freeness: For all i and j: vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj)− ǫ.
• ǫ-equitability: For all i and j: |vi(Ai)− vj(Aj)| ≤ ǫ.
• ǫ-perfection: For all i and j: |vi(Aj)− 1/n| ≤ ǫ.
For every profile of valuations, it is possible to achieve each one of these fairness notions
exactly, i.e. with ǫ = 0 (see, e.g., [BT96, RW98, Pro13]). The question is how many cuts
are needed. In the simplest case, we can give each participant a connected piece of the cake
(i.e. Ai = [ai, bi], for all i and some interval [ai, bi]), but this is not always possible and for
some notions of fairness the cake must be cut into a larger number of sub-intervals. Proportional
cake cutting, envy-free cake cutting, and equitable cake cutting are each possible with connected
pieces (i.e. n− 1 cuts), while perfect cake-cutting is possible with n(n− 1) cuts (but not less).
Clearly the more cuts do we allow a protocol to make, the easier its job may become.
The number of players will be fixed and arbitrary. The number of cuts for any allocation
that a protocol can output will be bounded by a constant which may depend on the number of
players. Finally, some of our results will be about general (abstract) notions of fairness, which
encompass the four notions above. We will require from a fairness notion that it admits an
approximate version as follows.
Definition 3 (Abstract fairness). An abstract fairness notion F must satisfy the condition:
• Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be any allocation that is F-fair with respect to some valuations
v = (v1 . . . vn). Then for any ǫ > 0 and valuations v
′ = (v′1 . . . v
′
n), if |vi(Aj)− v′i(Aj)| ≤ ǫ
∀i, j ∈ N , the allocation A is also ǫ-F-fair with respect to valuations v′.
2.2 Communication Complexity
The players will embark on a communication protocol. Each player i starts by knowing its own
valuation vi and the communication task is to find an allocation that is (approximately) fair
from the point of view of all the players. We will count not only bits of communication but also
the number of rounds of interaction. Some of our protocols are randomized (with public coins)
and need to compute the desired output with a specified probability of error.
8The number of cuts used to demarcate the allocation A would not increase if the piece A1 = [0.3, 0.4] were
expressed as A1 = [0.3, 0.4] ∪ [0.4, 0.5].
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Fair allocation problems are relations and their communication complexity will be defined
next (see [KN96], chapters 3 and 5). Each party knows its own valuation function. For random-
ized protocols, each party is also allowed to flip a random coin; that is, each party has access to
a private random string of some arbitrary length, where the strings are chosen independently
according to some probability distribution. For example, in the case of two parties, Alice and
Bob, holding valuations vAlice and vBob, and random strings rA and rB of arbitrary lengths,
each combination of vAlice, vBob, rA, rB determines a leaf in the protocol tree, which is marked
with some allocation A. The allocation A is defined as the output of the protocol on input
(vAlice, vBob).
Definition 4 (Deterministic and randomized communication complexity). For any notion of
fairness F , a protocol P computes an allocation that is fair according to F if for every profile
of valuations v1 . . . vn, the protocol reaches a leaf marked by an allocation A that is F-fair with
respect to the valuations v1 . . . vn. The deterministic communication complexity of the fairness
notion F , denoted D(F), is the number of bits sent on the worst case input by the best protocol
that computes F-fair allocations.
The randomized ǫ-error communication complexity of a fairness notion F , Rǫ(F), is the
worst case number of bits sent by the best randomized protocol that computes F-fair allocations
with probability 1− ǫ. The error probability is taken over the random choices of the protocol on
the worst case input.
In the definition of randomized protocols above, each party has its own random coins to flip;
this is referred to as the “private” coin model. It is also possible to allow the parties to have a
“public” coin, where all of them can see the results of a single series of random coin flips.
We will always require that our protocols produce allocations with at most a bounded
number of cuts C, where C may depend on n, but not on ǫ.
Definition 5. A communication protocol is a [t, r]-protocol if it has r rounds of communication
each using at most t bits of communication.
2.3 Why Bound the Density?
The bounded density requirement is the analogue of having no atoms. The necessity of bounding
the density can be demonstrated by the following impossibility result that applies not only to
communication protocols but also to any type of protocol that uses any type of queries that have
a finite number of possible answers (in contrast to the usual RW protocols in which answers to
queries are real numbers).
Definition 6. A cake cutting problem is called reasonable if whenever all players have all their
weight on some sub-interval [x, y], i.e. v1([x, y]) = v2([x, y]) = · · · = vn([x, y]) = 1, then the
allocation must cut the cake somewhere within this interval (and perhaps at finitely many other
locations as well).
Notice that all studied notions of approximate fairness are reasonable in this sense. For
concreteness think about the simplest challenge of (ǫ = 1/3)-approximate proportional cake
cutting between n = 2 players.
Lemma 1. A finite query protocol that always makes only a finite number of cuts cannot solve
any reasonable cake cutting challenge in time that is bounded by any function of ǫ and n on all
possibly-unbounded-density valuations.
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Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that the number of queries made by the protocol is
finite (for some fixed n and ǫ), i.e. the “computation tree” of the protocol has finite depth.
Since every query in the tree can have only a finite number of answers, every node in the tree
has a finite number of children, and so by Konig’s lemma, the whole computation tree is finite.
Since the protocol always makes only a finite number of cuts, the total number of locations x
at which the protocol ever makes a cut is finite – call this number M .
Now if we consider the possible input valuation profiles where all players have their valuation
concentrated on the sub-interval [x, x + δ] then, since the challenge is reasonable, the protocol
is required to be able to output a cut in every such interval. But when δ < 1/M , more than M
such possible answers are required.
2.4 Why Bound the Number of Pieces?
It turns out that if a protocol is not bounded in the number of pieces that it can produce, then
even ǫ-perfect cake-cutting becomes very easy.
Lemma 2. There exists a randomized public-coin protocol that produces an ǫ-perfect allocation
among any constant n number of players using C = O(ǫ−2) pieces with high probability without
any communication.
Proof. The unit interval is pre-split to O(ǫ−2) intervals of equals lengths (the hidden constant in
the big-O notation depends polynomially on n). The public random coins are used to allocate
each interval to one of the n players at random. With high probability each player will get a
total weight of within a few standard deviations from 1/n. The bounded density assumption
implies that each sub-interval has O(ǫ−2) weight for each of the players which implies that the
standard deviation here is O(ǫ). Thus the allocation specified by the public random coins is
ǫ-perfect with high probability.
While this protocol uses public coins, the standard simulation of [New91] implies a simulta-
neous private-coin protocol with O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
Open Problem 1. What is the deterministic simultaneous communication complexity of find-
ing a perfect allocation with C = poly(ǫ−1) cuts?
3 Basic Simulations
We provide several simulations, which use the observation that valuations with bounded density
can be approximated by simple piecewise-constant-density valuations.
Definition 7. A valuation v′ is called m-simple if (a) for every integer 0 ≤ k < m, we have
that v′([k/m, (k + 1)/m]) is itself an integer multiple of 1/m and (b) for every 0 < x < 1 we
have that v′([k/m, (k + x)/m]) = x · v′([k/m, (k + 1)/m]).
Initially each player will approximate its valuation function by a simple one.
Lemma 3. For any valuation v, there exists an m-simple valuation v′ such that for every
sub-interval [x, y] we have that |v([x, y]) − v′([x, y])| ≤ ǫ, where m = O(ǫ).
Proof. Let m be the smallest integer greater than 2/ǫ and define, for every integer 0 ≤ k ≤ m,
that v′([0, k/m]) = ⌈v([0, k/m])⌉ǫ, where ⌈y⌉ǫ is the smallest integer multiple of ǫ that is greater
or equal to y. Then interpolate and for every 0 < x < 1 set v′([k/m, (k + x)/m]) = x ·
v′([k/m, (k + 1)/m]). The valuation v′ obtained has the required property.
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From this we can easily deduce the following general simulation, which in particular implies
that bounded RW protocols can be simulated efficiently in the communication model.
Lemma 4. For any notion of fairness F that is guaranteed to exist and has at most a constant
C number of cuts, an ǫ-approximate version of this notion can be found by a simultaneous
protocol that uses O(ǫ−1 log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
Proof. Each player approximates its valuation by an m-simple one, as in Lemma 3, for m =
O(C · ǫ−1), and sends the complete description of the simple approximation. The assured fair
allocation for the approximating valuations is found, and by Lemma 3 (and the definition of
abstract fairness) it is also ǫ-fair for the original valuations.
3.1 Simulating the RW Model
Cake cutting protocols usually operate in a query model attributed to Robertson and Webb
[RW98] (and explicitely stated by Woeginger and Sgall [WS07]). In this model, the protocol
communicates with the players using the following types of queries:
• Cuti(α): Player i cuts the cake at a point y where vi(0, y) = α. The point y becomes a
cut point.
• Evali(y): Player i returns vi(0, y), where y is a previously made cut point.
Note the questions and answers have infinite precision. Any RW protocol asks the players a
sequence of cut and evaluate queries, at the end of which it outputs an allocation where the
pieces are demarcated by cut points.
We show a general simulation theorem for RW protocols as follows. First, we say that two
valuations v, v′ are ǫ-close if |v([x, y]) − v′([x, y])| ≤ ǫ for each interval [x, y].
Lemma 5. Let M be any protocol in the RW model which makes at most r queries and produces
an allocation of the cake with a number of cuts bounded by a constant C. Then there exists a
communication protocol Mǫ with r rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication each, such that
for every valuation tuple v, Mǫ(v) =M(v′), for a valuation tuple v′ that is ǫ/C-close to v.
Proof. Each player i that was given a valuation vi will first approximate it by a m-simple
valuation v′i as shown in Lemma 3 with m = O(C · ǫ−1), where C is the maximum number
of intervals that the cake can be cut into by protocol M. The players will run the simulated
protocol below on the v′i’s and as Lemma 3 guarantees that for every sub-interval |vi([x, y]) −
v′i([x, y])| ≤ ǫ/C, and each player gets at most C connected intervals, the lemma will follow.
To run the RW protocol M on the approximate valuations v′, note that the answer to any
RW query on these types of “simple” valuations requires only O(logm) = O(log ǫ−1) bits of
communication. Specifically, the exact real-valued answer to a query “v′i([0, x]) =?” with k/m ≤
x < (k+1)/m can be given by specifying the values v′i([0, k/m]) and v
′
i([0, (k+1)/m]) which are
integer multiples of 1/m and thus require O(logm) bits of communication. Similarly the answer
to a query “v′i([0, ?]) = x” can either be given by an integer k such that v
′
i([0, k/m]) = x if such
an integer exists, or otherwise by specifying the single integer k such that v′i([0, k/m]) < x <
v′i([0, (k + 1)/m]) as well as these two values themselves, still O(logm) bits of communication.
Thus the players can simulate the RW protocol using r rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits per round,
which implies a communication protocol Mǫ with the required properties.
By the definition of the closeness of v′ to v and relying on the bounded number of cuts, we
immediately get:
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Theorem 3.1. Let M be any protocol in the RW model that makes at most r queries and
outputs F-fair allocations. Then there exists a communication protocol Mǫ with r rounds of
O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication each, such that Mǫ outputs (ǫ-F)-fair allocations.
Applying the known bounded protocols in the RW model for computing proportional and
envy-free allocations [EP84, AM16] we get:
Corollary 4. For every ǫ > 0, ǫ-proportional cake cutting and ǫ-envy-free cake cutting among
any fixed number n of players can be done with O(1) rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
We note that our simulation theorem falls short of approximately simulating arbitrary RW
protocols for arbitrary problems since information can be lost when approximating by simple
valuations. This is demonstrated by the following example for n = 2 players.
• Ask Alice to cut the cake in half: x = Cut1(0.5).
• If x is irrational, Alice takes the whole cake.
• Else, Bob gets its favorite piece in {[0, x], [x, 1]} and Alice the remainder.
Let ǫ > 0. Consider hungry valuations v = (vAlice, vBob) such that Alice’s midpoint is
x ∈ ℜ \ Q. When running the protocol on valuations v, Alice takes the whole cake. However,
when the players approximate their valuations by some simple valuations v′, with m = O(ǫ−1)
intervals, Alice’s midpoint of the cake with respect to her new valuation v′Alice is a number x
′ ∈
Q, since 1/2 ∈ Q, m ∈ N, and her value for each interval [i/m, (i+ 1)/m] is an integer multiple
of 1/m. Thus the only kind of execution observed on simple valuations is the computation of
envy-free allocation between the two players. 9
3.2 Simulating Moving Knife Procedures
A family of protocols that has remained undefined until recently is that of moving knife proce-
dures, which involve multiple knives sliding over the cake until some stopping condition is met
(such as Austin’s moving knife procedure for finding a perfect allocation between two players
[RW98]). In a companion paper [BN17] we formalized moving knife protocols that can be ap-
proximately simulated in the RW model. Here we provide a more general definition of a class
of protocols that can be approximately simulated with little communication.
An example of a moving knife protocol is Austin’s procedure [RW98], which computes a
perfect allocation between two players with two cuts (which is the minimum number of cuts
required for perfect allocations) and operates as follows:
Austin’s procedure: A referee slowly moves a knife from left to right across the
cake. At any point, a player can call stop. When a player called, a second knife
is placed at the left edge of the cake. The player that shouted stop – say 1 – then
moves both knives parallel to each other. While the two knives are moving, player
2 can call stop at any time. After 2 called stop, a randomly selected player gets the
portion between player 1’s knives, while the other one gets the two outside pieces.
9This type of discrepancy can also be observed for fair protocols, such as the RW implementation of the
Dubins-Spanier protocol, where each player submits their 1/n mark (i.e. the point xi such that vi([0, xi]) = 1/n),
then the player with the leftmost mark receives the piece [0, xi], and the protocol is repeated with the remaining
n − 1 players on the leftover cake. If a player “trembles” when answering the cut queries, it can get pieces
worth very different values when running the protocol on simple valuations compared to the original valuations.
However, in this case, the allocation remains approximately proportional in both scenarios.
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The correctness is obtained by using the Intermediate Value Theorem. If at the beginning
of the operation player 2 values the piece between the knives at less than 1/2, then his value
for the remainder of the cake is more than 1/2. Then by the intermediate value theorem there
exists a position of the sword such that player 2’s value for the piece between the knives is
exactly 1/2. In general, moving knife protocols can have multiple knifes and multiple players
that move them across the cake until some stopping condition is met.
The high level description of our formal model has an ordered collection of “knives” each of
them controlled by a single player, who can place his knife on the cake based on the locations of
the previous knives in the collection as well as his own valuation. Each player moves his knife
continuously as a function of “the time” and the locations of the previous knives, until some
condition happens. The basic idea of the simulation is that (a) Given the position of previous
knives (and the current time), each player can announce the (approximate) position of his knife
using a small (O(log ǫ−1)) amount of communication (b) to find the (approximate) time where
the condition happens, the players can engage in a simple binary search which takes O(log ǫ−1)
rounds (in each of which each player had to announce his location).
The details of the definition balance between ensuring that everything is smooth and robust
enough so that this general idea can work and allowing enough flexibility to capture a wide
family of reasonable protocols including all known ones. In particular, our definition allows
multiple “moving knife steps” with “simple” and “robust” decisions between these steps, where
all known moving knife protocols require only a constant number of steps. The exact definition
appears in Appendix B, and it allows the following simulation statement.
Theorem 3.2. Let M be any moving knife protocol that runs in constantly many steps and
outputs F-fair partitions.
Then for every ǫ > 0, there is a communication protocol Mǫ that uses O(log ǫ−1) rounds
each with O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication and outputs ǫ-F-fair partitions.
This implies that procedures such as the Austin [Aus82] procedure, the Barbanel-Brams,
Stromquist, and Webb moving knife protocols [BB04, RW98], and the moving knife step for
computing equitable allocations among any number of players [BN17, SHS17] can be simulated
efficiently in the communication model.
Corollary 5. Austin’s procedure for computing a perfect allocation between two players, the
Barbanel-Brams, Stromquist, and Webb procedures for computing an envy-free allocation with
connected pieces among n = 3 players, and the moving knife step for computing an equitable
allocation for any fixed number n of players can be simulated using O(log ǫ−1) rounds each with
O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication for all ǫ > 0.
Notice that this simulation requires O(log ǫ−1) rounds of communication, as opposed to the
simulation of the RW model that only requires a constant number of rounds. Our lower bounds
(Corollary 8) will imply that this is unavoidable.
4 Proportional Cake Cutting
We turn to the problem of computing allocations for specific fairness notions and start with the
most basic, known as proportionality.
4.1 A General Logarithmic Lower Bound
A logarithmic (in ǫ−1) lower bound is trivial not just for communication protocols but for any
model with a bounded number of answers to every query. This lower bound applies to essentially
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any cake cutting challenge, and we will prove it for the simplest one of proportional cake cutting
between any fixed number n ≥ 2 of players.
Theorem 4.1. For every fixed n ≥ 2, any protocol whose queries all have a bounded number of
possible answers and always makes at most C cuts requires Ω(log ǫ−1) queries for ǫ-proportional
cake cutting between n of players.
Proof. We will show that the computation tree of the protocol requires ǫ−Ω(1) leaves. Let t be
the total number of leaves of the protocol and let X = {x1 < x2 < · · · < xk} be the set of all
cuts made at all leaves of the protocol (thus k ≤ C · t).
We will now choose a profile of valuations on which it is impossible that the protocol achieves
ǫ-proportionality. In this chosen profile, all players will have the exact same valuation v1 = · · · =
vn = v. We will choose v in a way that puts a weight that is an integer multiple of 1/R, for
some fixed integer R, in every sub-interval [xi, xi+1]. That would imply that every player gets
a total value that is an integer multiple of 1/R. If we choose R to be relatively prime to n then
certainly for every integer m we would have |m/R−1/n| > 1/(nR). If 1/(nR) > ǫ then at least
one player would have to get a value that is less than 1/n by more than ǫ.
We will choose R ≈ 1/(10nǫ) which is relatively prime to n which ensures that 1/(nR) > ǫ
and now need to construct the required valuation v. Our goal is to assign to every sub-interval
[xi, xi+1] a weight that is an integer multiple of 1/R that is close to its length xi+1−xi. This is
done by first rounding xi+1−xi down to an integer multiple of 1/R and setting it as (our initial
version of) v([xi, xi+1]). This is not quite a valuation since we may be missing a total weight
that is at most k/R (a rounding loss of at most 1/R for each of the k sub-intervals). Now, if
k <
√
R = O(ǫ−1/2) then the longest of the k sub-intervals is longer than k/R and we can put
all the missing weight on it, increasing the density on it from at most 1 to at most 2 satisfying
the condition of bounded density.
4.2 A Simultaneous Upper Bound
The number of rounds in the general RW simulation is the same as the number of queries in the
original RW protocol. In some cases one can get very simple communication protocols, such as
the following, which is derived from a simultaneous protocol from [BBKP14].
Theorem 4.2. For every fixed n, there exists a protocol for finding a connected ǫ-proportional
allocation between n players, where the players simultaneously, in a single round, send O(log ǫ−1)
bits of communication and the allocation is determined by the sent messages.
Proof. The players first approximate their valuations by m-simple ones (for m = O(ǫ−1)) and
then each player i sends the n− 1 locations that split its simple valuation into n pieces each of
weight exactly 1/n. (As in the proof of Lemma 5, the simplicity of the approximating valuation
allows representing each of these locations using O(log ǫ−1) bits.)
We can now use this information to construct a proportional allocation among the approxi-
mating valuations: denote xji to be the j location sent by player i, and for notational convenience
define x0i = 0 and x
n
i = 1 for all players. Thus we have that vi([xj−1, xj ]) = 1/n for all i = 1 . . . n
and j = 1 . . . n (here vi is the approximate simple valuation, not the original one.)
Let i1 = argmini x
1
i and let x
1∗ = x1i1 and allocate [0, x
1∗] to i1. Let i2 = argmini 6=i1 x
2
i and
x2∗ = x
2
i2
, and allocate [x1∗, x
2
∗] to i2. Similarly, at each stage we allocate the next piece the the
player who wants the smallest amount. The correctness of this allocation follows from the fact
that at each step k of the allocation, the allocated piece of the cake was to the left of xki for all
unallocated players i.
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Open Problem 2. What is the simultaneous communication complexity of ǫ-envy-free cake
cutting between n = 3 players (into an arbitrary finite number of pieces)?
5 Equitable, Perfect, and Envy-Free Cake-Cutting
Finally we study fairness notions 10 for which moving knife protocols exist: equitable and perfect
allocations for n = 2 players, and envy-free for n = 3 players.
5.1 The Crossing Problem
We will relate these fair division problems through a discrete search problem called crossing
that we now introduce.
Definition 8. The general crossing(m) problem is the following: Alice gets a sequence of
integer numbers x0, x1, . . . , xm with 0 ≤ xi ≤ m for all i and similarly Bob gets a sequence of
integer numbers y0, y1, . . . , ym with 0 ≤ yi ≤ m for all i, and such that x0 ≤ y0 and xm ≥ ym.
Their goal is to find an index 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that either both xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi or that
both xi−1 ≥ yi−1 and xi ≤ yi.11
In the monotone variant, mon− crossing(m), Alice and Bob are also assured that 0 = x0 ≤
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xm = m and m = y0 ≥ y1 ≥ · · · ≥ ym = 0 and again need to find an index
1 ≤ i ≤ m such that xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi.
The ǫ-equitable cake cutting problem can be seen as equivalent to monotone crossing as
follows.
Lemma 6. For n = 2 players, the ǫ-equitable cake-cutting problem into C = 2 connected pieces
can be reduced to the mon − crossing(m) problem for m = O(ǫ−1) with an additional single
round where each player send O(logm) bits to the other one.
Proof. The players will start by rounding their valuations tom-simple ones as allowed by Lemma
3 (with m = O(ǫ−1)), and will achieve an equitable allocation on these simple valuations which
by Lemma 3 also approximately solves the problem on the original valuations. So for the rest
of this proof let us assume that each v is already m-simple.
Now, for a fixed player, if we define xi = v([0, i/m]) ·m, we certainly get that 0 = x0 ≤ x1 ≤
x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xm−1 ≤ xm = m. Let us denote, just for Bob, yi = m− xi so m = y0 ≥ y1 ≥ y2 ≥
· · · ≥ ym−1 ≥ ym = 0. (And for Alice we keep the x notation.)
A solution for the mon− crossing(m) problem on these vectors x0 . . . xm and y0 . . . ym will
give an index i such that xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi and thus vAlice([0, (i− 1)/m])) + vBob([0, (i−
1)/m]) ≤ 1 while vAlice([0, i/m]) + vBob([0, i/m]) ≥ 1 which implies that for some intermediate
value (i − 1)/m ≤ x∗ ≤ i/m we have exactly vAlice([0, x∗]) + vBob([0, x∗]) = 1 and moreover
since simple valuations, by definition, are linear between (i − 1)/m and i/m, the exact value
of x∗ can be computed from the values xi−1, xi, yi−1, yi which the players can send to each
other in a single round. Now splitting the cake at location x∗ is an equitable allocation since
vBob([x∗, 1]) = 1− vBob([0, x∗]) = vAlice([0, x∗]).
Lemma 7. The mon − crossing(m) problem can be reduced (without any additional commu-
nication) into the ǫ-equitable cake cutting problem among n = 2 players into C = 2 connected
pieces, with ǫ−1 = O(m2).
10We focus on allocations that use a minimum number of cuts.
11An even more difficult variant of this problem would insist that the output is the former rather than the
latter. This variant does not seem to correspond directly to any fair division problem so we will not name it. It
is worth noting that the protocol in the proof of theorem 5.1 solves this harder variant as well.
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Proof. Given her input 0 = x0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · ≤ xm−1 ≤ xm = m, Alice will construct the
following valuation vAlice:
• vAlice([0, 1/3]) = vAlice([2/3, 1]) = (1 − 1/m)/2. (I.e. only 1/m weight is left for the
sub-interval [1/3, 2/3].)
• Constant density within [0, 1/3] and [2/3, 1]. I.e. the density in these two sub-intervals is
3 · (1− 1/m)/2).
• For every integer 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let vAlice([1/3, 1/3 + i/(3m)]) = xi/m2.
• Constant density within each subinterval [1/3 + i/(3m), 1/3 + (i + 1)/(3m)]. I.e. the
density is 3 · (xi+1 − xi)/m ≤ 3.
Bob will similarly create his own valuation vBob using the values x
Bob
i = m− yi. Notice that
for each i we have that vAlice([1/3, 1/3+i/(3m)])+vBob([1/3, 1/3+i/(3m)]) = (xi+m−yi)/m2,
and so vAlice([0, 1/3+i/(3m)])+vBob(0, 1/3+i/(3m)]) = 1−1/m+(xi+m−yi)/m2. In particular,
due to the integrality of xi and yi, if xi > yi then vAlice([0, 1/3 + i/(3m)]) + vBob(0, 1/3 +
i/(3m)]) > 1 + 1/m2 while if xi < yi then vAlice([0, 1/3 + i/(3m)]) + vBob(0, 1/3 + i/(3m)]) <
1− 1/m2.
Now consider a solution (i−1)/m ≤ x∗ ≤ i/m to the ǫ-equitable cake cutting problem where
vAlice([0, x∗]) − vBob([x∗, 1])| ≤ ǫ, equivalently, 1 − ǫ ≤ vAlice([0, x∗]) + vBob([0, x∗]) ≤ 1 + ǫ. If
ǫ < 1/m2 then this cannot be the case if either xi ≥ xi−1 > yi−1 > yi or xi−1 ≤ xi < yi ≤ yi−1.
It thus follows that xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi as needed.
Next we show that ǫ-perfect cake cutting is equivalent to the general crossing problem. The
omitted proofs of this section can be found in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 8. For n = 2 players, the ǫ-perfect cake-cutting problem into C = 3 intervals can be
reduced to the general crossing(m) problem for m = O(ǫ−1) with a single additional round of
O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
Lemma 9. The general crossing(m) problem can be reduced (without any additional communi-
cation) into the ǫ-perfect cake cutting problem among n = 2 players into C = 3 intervals, with
ǫ−1 = O(m2).
Finally, we show ǫ-envy-free cake cutting for n = 3 players can be reduced to monotone
crossing.
Lemma 10. For n = 3 players, the ǫ-envy-free cake-cutting problem with connected pieces can
be reduced to the mon − crossing(m) problem for m = O(ǫ−1) with an additional constant
number of rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
5.2 The Communication Complexity of the Crossing Problem
We study the communication complexity of the crossing problem and start with an upper bound.
Theorem 5.1. The deterministic communication complexity of crossing(m) is O(log2m). The
randomized communication complexity of crossing(m) is O(logm log logm).
Proof. The deterministic upper bound follows from our general simulation result of moving
knife procedures, but here is a simple protocol: the players perform a binary search over the
indices. At each point during the search they have a sub-interval of indices where xa ≤ ya and
xb ≥ yb, looking at the middle point c between a and b, once they determine whether xc ≥ yc
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or xc ≤ yc they know which sub-interval to continue the search in. Since xc and yc are integers
in the range 0 . . . m, comparing xc and yc requires O(logm) bits of communication. The binary
search itself requires O(logm) such comparisons.
For the randomized protocol, we invoke the results of [Nis93] stating that the randomized
communication complexity of determining which of two k-bit integers (here we have k = logm)
is larger is O(log k). Moreover, with that complexity the probability of error can be made
reduced to be 1/kc for any desired constant c. Thus each of the comparisons in our protocol can
be done, with probability of error, say, 1/(log2m) by a randomized protocol with O(log logm)
bits of communication. Since we make at most logm such comparisons, the total probability of
error still stays low, and the total number of bits of communication is as required.
For the monotone variant we give a more efficient protocol that uses only O(logm) com-
munication. Towards this end, we consider two parameters for the problem: m, the number of
integers held by the players and k, the upper bound on their values.
Definition 9. The mon − crossing(m,k) problem is the following: Alice gets a sequence of
integer numbers 0 = x0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xm = k and Bob gets a sequence of integer numbers
k = y0 ≥ y1 ≥ · · · ≥ ym = 0. Their goal is to find an index 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that xi−1 ≤ yi−1
and xi ≥ yi.
Theorem 5.2. The (deterministic) communication complexity of the mon − crossing(m,k)
problem is O(logm+ log k). In particular when m = k (what we called the mon− crossing(m)
problem), the communication complexity is O(logm).
Proof. In the first step Alice and Bob each send a single bit describing whether xm/2 < k/2?
and ym/2 < k/2?. Now there are four possible answers:
• If xm/2 < k/2 and ym/2 < k/2 then define x′i = min(k/2, xi) and y′i = min(k/2, yi).
Notice that 0 = x′0 ≤ x′1 ≤ x′2 ≤ · · · ≤ x′m = k/2 and k/2 = y′0 ≥ y′1 ≥ · · · ≥ y′m = 0,
so we solve the problem recursively on the x′i’s and y
′
i’s and find an index i such that
x′i−1 ≤ y′i−1 and x′i ≥ y′i.
Now if i ≤ m/2 then xi−1 ≤ xi ≤ xm/2 < k/2 and so x′i−1 = xi−1 and x′i = xi and since
y′i ≤ x′i < k/2 also y′i = yi, while for i− 1 we only know that yi−1 ≥ y′i−1. So we get that
xi−1 = x′i−1 ≤ y′i−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi = x′i ≥ y′i = yi as needed.
On the other hand if i > m/2 i.e. i − 1 ≥ m/2 then yi ≤ yi−1 ≤ ym/2 < k/2 and so
y′i−1 = yi−1 and y
′
i = yi and since xi−1 ≤ yi−1 < k/2 also x′i−1 = xi−1, while for i we only
know that xi ≥ x′i. So we get that xi−1 = x′i−1 ≤ y′i−1 = yi−1 and xi ≥ x′i ≥ y′i = yi as
needed.
• If xm/2 ≥ k/2 and ym/2 ≥ k/2 then define x′i = max(k/2, xi)−k/2 and y′i = max(k/2, yi)−
k/2. Notice that 0 = x′0 ≤ x′1 ≤ x′2 ≤ · · · ≤ x′m = k/2 and k/2 = y′0 ≥ y′1 ≥ · · · ≥ y′m = 0,
so we solve the problem recursively on the x′i’s and y
′
i’s and find an index i such that
x′i−1 ≤ y′i−1 and x′i ≥ y′i.
Now if i > m/2 i.e. i− 1 ≥ m/2 then xi ≥ xi−1 ≥ xm/2 ≥ k/2 and so x′i−1 = xi−1 − k/2
and x′i = xi − k/2 and since y′i−1 ≥ 0 also y′i−1 = yi−1 − k/2, while for i we only
know that y′i ≥ yi − k/2. So we get that xi−1 = x′i−1 + k/2 ≤ y′i−1 + k/2 = yi−1 and
xi = x
′
i + k/2 ≥ y′i + k/2 ≥ yi as needed.
On the other hand if i ≤ m/2 then yi−1 ≥ yi ≥ ym/2 ≥ k/2 and so y′i−1 = yi−1 − k/2
and y′i = yi − k/2 and since x′i ≥ 0 also x′i = xi − k/2, while for i − 1 we only know
that x′i−1 ≥ x′i−1 − k/2. So we get that xi−1 ≤ x′i−1 + k/2 ≤ y′i−1 + k/2 = yi−1 and
xi = x
′
i + k/2 ≥ y′i + k/2 = yi as needed.
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• If xm/2 ≥ k/2 and ym/2 < k/2 then change the values ym/2 = 0 and xm/2 = k and solve
the problem recursively on 0 = x0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xm/2−1 ≤ xm/2 = k and k = y0 ≥ · · · ≥
ym/2−1 ≥ ym/2 = 0 and find an index i such that xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi (with the new
values of xm/2 and ym/2). If i < m/2 then clearly we have the same inequalities with the
old values as well. If i = m/2 then since with the original values of xm/2 and ym/2 we
have that xm/2 ≥ k/2 > ym/2 then i is a solution for the original problem as well.
• If xm/2 < k/2 and ym/2 ≥ k/2 then change the values ym/2 = k and xm/2 = 0 and
solve the problem recursively on 0 = xm/2 ≤ xm/2+1 ≤ · · · ≤ xm−1 ≤ xm = k and
k = ym/2 ≥ ym/2+1 ≥ · · · ≥ ym−1 ≥ ym = 0 and find an index i such that xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and
xi ≥ yi (with the new values of xm/2 and ym/2). If i− 1 > m/2 then clearly we have the
same inequalities with the old values as well. If i − 1 = m/2 then since with the original
values of xm/2 and ym/2 we have that xm/2 < k/2 ≤ ym/2 then i is a solution for the
original problem as well.
Now notice that in the first two cases the recursive problem had a value of k that was
half of the original problem, while in the last two cases, the recursive problem had a value
of m that is half of the original value. Thus we get the upper bound on communication of
CC(m,k) ≤ 2 +max(CC(m/2, k), CC(m,k/2)) and the lemma follows.
Applying the equivalence of the two variants of the crossing problem to our fair division
problems we get:
Corollary 6. The deterministic communication complexity of finding an ǫ-perfect allocation
with two cuts between n = 2 players is O(log2 ǫ−1). The randomized communication complexity
of this problem is O(log ǫ−1 log log ǫ−1).
Corollary 7. The deterministic communication complexity of finding a connected ǫ-equitable
allocation between n = 2 players and a connected ǫ-envy-free allocation among n = 3 players is
O(log ǫ−1).
At this point one may wonder whether the communication complexity of the general crossing(m)
problem is also in fact logarithmic, maybe even for deterministic protocols. We leave this as an
open question.
The main apparent difference though between the two fair division problems considered here
and the “easy” fair division problems mentioned in Corollary 4 is the fact that it seems that the
binary search process here (as well as in the general simulation of moving knife procedures in
Section 3.2) cannot be done in a constant number of rounds. Our main technical lower bound
proves that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 5.3. Any (deterministic or randomized) protocol that solves mon−crossing(m) using
rounds of communication of t-bits each (with logm ≤ t ≤ m) requires Ω(logm/ log t) rounds of
communication.
Corollary 8. Any (deterministic or randomized) protocol for finding an ǫ-perfect allocation
with 2-cuts between n = 2 players or for finding an ǫ-equitable allocation between n = 2 players
using rounds of communication of polylog(ǫ−1)-bits each requires Ω(log ǫ−1/ log log ǫ−1) rounds
of communication.
Our lower bound will follow the general “round elimination technique” formalized by the
the “round elimination lemma” of [MNSW95], which was somewhat strengthened in [SV08].
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Definition 10. Given a communication problem f(x, y) and a parameter k we define a new
communication problem, denoted by P k(f) as follows: Alice gets k strings x1, . . . , xk and Bob
gets a string y and an integer 1 ≤ z ≤ k. Their aim is to compute f(xz, y).
Suppose a protocol for this new problem is given, where Alice goes first, sending Bob t bits,
where t << k. Intuitively, it would seem that since Alice does not know z, the first round of
communication cannot be productive. It turns out that this is correct.
Lemma 11. (Round Elimination Lemma, [MNSW95, SV08]): Suppose there is a [t, r]
protocol with Alice going first for solving P k(f) with probability of error δ then there is a [t, r−1]-
protocol (with Bob going first) for solving f with probability of error δ +
√
t/k.
In order to use this lemma repeatedly towards contradiction, each time removing another
round of communication, we will require a lemma showing how to reduce the P k(mon −
crossing(m)) problem into a single instance of mon− crossing(mk).
Lemma 12. The P k(mon−crossing(m)) problem can be reduced, without any communication,
to a single mon− crossing(km) problem.
Proof. Alice holds k vectors of lengthm+1 each (x10 . . . x
1
m) . . . (x
k
0 . . . x
k
m) and will produce from
them a single vector as follows: for every i = 0 . . . m and every j = 1 . . . k we set X(j−1)·m+i =
xji + (j − 1)m. Notice that indices that are integer multiples of m are defined twice, once as
X(j−1)m = x
j
0+(j−1)m and also as X(j−2)m = xj−1m +(j−2)m, but since xj0 = 0 and xj−1m = m
these values are the same. Also notice that the X’s are monotone increasing.
Bob that get y0 . . . ym and an index z will produce the longer vector as follows: Y0 = Y1 =
· · · = Y(z−1)m = mk, Yzm = Yzm+1 = · · · = Ykm = 0 and for all i = 0 . . . m, Y(z−1)m+i =
yi + (z − 1)m. Notice that Y is monotone decreasing.
Now let us look at a solution for the mon − crossing(km) problem on X and Y , which is
some location w where Yw ≥ Xw but Yw+1 ≤ Xw+1. First we must have w + 1 > (z − 1)m
(since Y(z−1)m = km > (z − 1)m = X(z−1)m) and also w < zm (since Yzm = 0 < zm = Xzm).
Thus w = (z − 1)m + i for some 0 ≤ i < m so Xw = X(z−1)m+i = xzi + (z − 1)m and
Yw = Y(z−1)m+i = yi+(z−1)m and similarlyXw+1 = xzi+1+(z−1)m and Yw+1 = yi+1+(z−1)m.
It follows that yi ≥ xzi but yi+1 ≤ xzi+1 as needed for the solution of our P k(mon−crossing(m))
problem.
We can now complete the proof of the main lower bound.
Lemma 13. Any (deterministic or randomized) protocol that solves mon − crossing(m) in
r rounds with probability of error 1/3 − 1/(10r) must send at least t = Ω(m1/r/r4) bits of
communication in at least one of these rounds.
Proof. Let us start by proving the base case, r = 1. By the lemma above, a 1-round protocol
for mon − crossing(m) (with, say, probability of error 1/3) implies a 1-round protocol for
Pm/3(mon− crossing(3)) (with the same error) which, if t < m/300 implies a 0-round protocol
for mon− crossing(3) with an error larger by an additive 1/10, but a 0-round protocol uses no
communication so it cannot solve the mon − crossing(m) problem even for a constant m = 3
(say) and error 1/3 + 1/10.
Now for the induction step: assume by way of contradiction a r-round protocol for mon −
crossing(m) that uses t < m1/r/(100r4) bits per round and has probability of error at most
ǫ ≤ 1/3 − 1/(10r). Take k = m1/r so by the two lemmas above a r-round protocol for mon −
crossing(m) implies a similar r round protocol for P k(m(r−1)/r) which implies a r − 1 round
protocol for m′ = m(r−1)/r that uses t bits of communication per round with probability of
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error ǫ+ 1/10r2. But notice that (m′)1/(r−1) = m1/r so so we get a (r − 1)-round protocol for
mon − crossing(m′) with t < (m′)1/(r−1)/(100r4) ≤ (m′)1/(r−1)/(100(r − 1)4) and error of at
most (1/3 − 1/(10r)) + 1/1(10r2) ≤ 1/3 − 1/(10(r − 1)) which is impossible by the induction
hypothesis.
We note that the exact form of the error probability is only for the convenience of the
induction. Clearly the same bound holds for any constant error.
6 Discussion
A remaining interesting direction is to understand the joint dependence on n and ǫ. We sum-
marize the upper bounds for deterministic protocols (both from previous literature and here)
in the next table.
Fairness notion Number of players Upper bounds for deterministic protocols
ǫ-proportional (connected) n ≥ 2 O (n log n · log ǫ−1) [EP84]
ǫ-envy-free (any number of cuts) n ≥ 2 O
(
nn
nn
nn
· log ǫ−1
)
[AM16]
ǫ-envy-free (connected)
n = 2 O(log ǫ−1) [RW98]
n = 3 O(log2 ǫ−1) [BN17]
n ≥ 4 O(n · ǫ−1 log ǫ−1) (∗)
ǫ-equitable (connected)
n = 2 O(log2 ǫ−1) [CP12]
n ≥ 3 O (min{n, ǫ−1} · log2 ǫ−1) [CP12, PW17]
ǫ-perfect (minimum cuts)
n = 2 O(log2 ǫ−1) [BN17]
n ≥ 3 O (n3 · ǫ−1 log ǫ−1) (∗)
Table 1: Communication complexity upper bounds for deterministic protocols. The number of
players is arbitrary. The bounds marked with blue references are obtained by simulating in the
communication model protocols from the RW model. The bounds marked with (∗) are implied
by the general simulation in this paper (Proposition 3) of fairness notions that are guaranteed
to exist with a bounded number of cuts.
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A Equitable, Perfect, and Envy-Free Cake-Cutting
A.1 The Crossing Problem
In this section we include the omitted proofs of the reductions between the crossing problem
and fair division problems.
Lemma 8. For n = 2 players, the ǫ-perfect cake-cutting problem into C = 3 intervals can be
reduced to the general crossing(m) problem for m = O(ǫ−1) with a single additional round of
O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
Proof. Fix m = 5D/ǫ, where D is the upper bound on the density of the players’ valuations.
For ease of notation let each of the two players slightly perturb its valuation by at most 1/m so
that v([0, k/m]) = v([k/m, 1]) = 1/2 for some integer k (that may be different for each of the
two players). We will find a 4ǫ/5-perfect cutting for the perturbed valuations which implies an
ǫ-perfect one for the original valuations.
In a single round of communication the players exchange their values of k, and without loss
of generality assume that Alice’s k is no larger than Bob’s k, and from now on we will let k
be Alice’s value. Thus vAlice([0, k/m]) = vAlice[k/m, 1]) = 1/2 while vBob([0, k/m]) ≤ 1/2 and
vBob[k/m, 1]) ≥ 1/2.
Alice chooses x0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xk so that xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} is the integer that minimizes
|vAlice([i/m, xi/m]) − 1/2|. Note that since the density is at most D, the maximum weight of
an interval of length 1/m is D/m ≤ ǫ/5 so we sure get |vAlice([i/m, xi/m]) − 1/2| ≤ ǫ/5. Bob
chooses in a similar fashion y0 ≤ y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yk. Note that since vBob([k/m, 1]) ≥ 1/2, then the
yi’s are still well defined and are within the range [k,m] even though we are using Alice’s value
of k. Thus x0 = k and xk = m while y0 ≥ k and yk ≤ m so if we pad xk = xk+1 = · · · = xm
and yk = yk+1 = · · · = ym then we get vectors that satisfy the input conditions to the general
crossing(m) problem.12
Now assume that we get a solution to the general crossing(m) problem which wlog we
assume is xi−1 ≤ yi1 and xi ≥ yi (the other case is similar). We claim that cutting the
cake at i/m and at xi/m and handing one of the players the middle part is an approximately
perfect cake cutting. By our construction vAlice([i/m, xi/m]) − 1/2| ≤ ǫ/5. We can calculate
vBob([i/m, xi/m]) = vBob([i/m, yi/m]) − vBob([xi/m, yi/m]). For the first term we have by our
construction |vBob([i/m, yi/m]) − 1/2| ≤ ǫ/5. Since yi−1 ≤ xi−1 ≤ xi, the second term can
be bounded by vBob([xi/m, yi/m]) ≤ vBob([yi−1/m, yi/m]) which in turn can be bounded by
vBob([yi−1/m, yi/m]) = vBob([i/m, yi/m]) − vBob([(i − 1)/m, yi−1/m]) − vBob([(i − 1)/m, i/m]).
The first two terms are each within ǫ/5 from 1/2 and the second term is at most D/m ≤ ǫ/5
thus in total we have bounded |vBob([i/m, xi/m])− 1/2| ≤ 4ǫ/5 as needed.
Lemma 9. The general crossing(m) problem can be reduced (without any additional commu-
nication) into the ǫ-perfect cake cutting problem among n = 2 players into C = 3 intervals, with
ǫ−1 = O(m2).
Proof. The two players are given their inputs x0 . . . xm and y0 . . . ym to the crossing(m) prob-
lem and need to construct valuations vA and vB from them. We first assume without loss of
generality (by padding) that x0 = 0, xm = m.
For simplicity of presentation each of the two players will slightly modify their input by
adding the quantity 2m2+m+2mi to each xi and yi. Notice that the range of the xi’s and yi’s is
now {H, 2H}, whereH = 2m2+m and each vector is monotone increasing: m ≤ xi+1−xi ≤ 3m.
12Note that even though both vectors are monotone, we still don’t get an instance of the monotone crossing
problem since here both vectors are increasing rather than one of them decreasing.
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The required answer to the crossing(m) problem with these new values is still the same as for
the original problem since each pair of xi and yi were increased by the same amount. From now
on we will use the notation xi and yi to be the new modified values rather than the original
ones. (So now we have x0 = H and xm = 2H while y0 ≥ H and ym ≤ 2H.)
Alice will define her valuation vAlice as follows:
• vAlice([0, x0/(2H)]) = 1/2 with uniform density inside this interval.
• For every i = 1 . . . m, vAlice([xi−1/(2H), xi/(2H)]) = 1/(2m), with uniform density inside
this interval. (Note that the density is bounded from below and from above by a constant.)
Bob will create his valuation xBob similarly but with the y values. This implies that for
every i = 0 . . . m we have vAlice([i/(2m), xi/(2H)]) = 1/2, and vBob([i/(2m), yi/(2H)]) = 1/2.
Now consider some solution to the ǫ-perfect allocation problem. I.e. some interval such that
|vAlice([a, b])−1/2| ≤ ǫ and |vBob([a, b])−1/2| ≤ ǫ. Let us assume that (i−1)/(2m) ≤ a ≤ i/(2m)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and present a = α(1 − i)/(2m) + (1 − α)i/(2m) for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.13 So we
must also have b = αxi−1/(2H) + (1 − α)xi/(2H) + O(ǫ) (since vAlice([i/(2m), xi/(2H)]) =
1/2 and vAlice has uniform density within each of the sub-intervals [(i − 1)/(2m), i/(2m)] and
[xi−1/(2H), xi/(2H)] and since the density is bounded by a constant from below and from
above.) For the same reason, using vBob we must have b = αyi−1/(2H)+(1−α)yi/(2H)+O(ǫ).
Now notice that if both xi−1 > yi−1 and xi > yi then since these are integers then αxi−1/(2H)+
(1− α)xi/(2H) must be larger than αyi−1/(2H) + (1− α)yi/(2H) by at least 1/(2H) (and the
opposite must) be true in the dual case where xi−1 < yi−1 and xi < yi). This is impossible
if the O(ǫ) term is smaller than 1/(2H) in which case it follows that either xi−1 ≥ yi−1 and
xi ≤ yi or vice versa, as required.
We also show that mon− crossing can be used to solve the envy-free cake cutting problem
with connected pieces for three players.
Lemma 10. For n = 3 players, the ǫ-envy-free cake-cutting problem with connected pieces
can be reduced to the mon− crossing(m) problem for m = O(ǫ−1) with an additional constant
number of rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
Proof. Given a cake cutting problem among Alice, Bob, and Carol, we will construct a monotone
crossing instance whose solution will reveal an approximate solution to the envy-free allocation
among the three players. Again each player starts by perturbing its valuation to make it m-
simple, for m = 10D/ǫ. We will find an ǫ/2-envy-free allocation for the m-simple valuations,
which will automatically give an ǫ-envy-free allocation for the original valuations.
Let the players exchange their midpoints of the cake (mA,mB ,mC), the 1/3 marks (i.e. the
points ℓA, ℓB , ℓC for which vAlice([0, ℓA]) = vBob([0, ℓB ]) = vCarol([0, ℓC ]) = 1/3), and the 2/3
marks (rA, rB , rC). This can be done in one round with O(log ǫ
−1) bits of communication.
W.l.o.g., assume that ℓA ≤ ℓB ≤ ℓC . If there is an ǫ/2-envy-free allocation with cuts ℓA and
rA, return it. These preferences can be determined with O(1) communication. Otherwise, both
Bob and Carol prefer one of the pieces [ℓA, rA] or [rA, 1] to the outside options by more than
ǫ/2. We have two cases:
• Case 1: Bob and Carol prefer the piece [ℓA, rA].
13We are ignoring here the theoretical possibility that a is larger than 1/2 which, since vAlice([1/2, 1]) = 1/2
and vAlice has density bounded from below by a constant, can only be true when a ≤ 1/2 +O(ǫ), in which case
the inequality holds for i = m to within an additive O(ǫ) term, which suffices for the rest of the proof.
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If mA ≤ mB, Alice and Bob calculate j = ⌊m · ℓA⌋ and k = ⌊m · mA⌋. If mA > mB,
they set j = ⌊m · ℓA⌋ and k = ⌊m · mB⌋. We will show the details for mA ≤ mB ; the
arguments for the other case are similar. Clearly 0 ≤ j ≤ k < m. Alice defines her sequence
x starting with xj = ⌊m · rA⌋. The first term, xj, is set to an integer for which the difference
|vAlice([0, j/m])−vAlice([xj/m, 1])| is minimized. Each additional term xi is defined as an integer
smaller than or equal to xi−1 for which |vAlice([0, i/m])−vAlice([xi/m, 1])| is minimal. Since each
interval [ℓ/m, (ℓ+ 1)/m] is worth at most ǫ/10 to either player, we have that |vAlice([0, i/m])−
vAlice([xi/m, 1])| ≤ ǫ/10.
Bob will use his valuation to define a weakly increasing sequence y as follows. For each
i = j, . . . , k, set yi as the integer for which the piece [i/m, yi/m] is as close as possible from
Bob’s point of view to the largest outside option (i.e. [0, i/m] or [yi/m, 1]), such that yi ≥ yi−1.
In case of ties, the first term, yj , is chosen as small as possible. The sequence y can always
be set to be weakly increasing for the following reason. On the range of indices i for which
i/m ∈ [ℓA, ℓB], the terms yi are increasing since the piece [0, i/m] is worth less than 1/3 to
Bob, the piece [i/m, 1] is shrinking as i increases, and so the (approximate) tie must be created
between [i/m, yi/m] and [yi/m, 1]. On the range of indices i for which i/m ≥ ℓB , the yi terms
continue to grow as i increases since the largest of [i/m, yi/m], [yi/m, 1] must now match the
(increasing) value of the piece [0, i/m], which has become the largest (approximately). We
obtain that for all i = j . . . k, |vBob([i/m, yi/m])−max {vBob([0, i/m]), vBob([yi/m, 1])}| ≤ ǫ/10.
Finally, Alice sets the prefix of her sequence to m and the suffix to zero, while Bob does so
reversely (i.e. x1 = . . . = xj−1 = m = yk+1 = . . . = ym and y1 = . . . = yj = 0 = xk+1 = . . . xm).
We show the crossing terms for x and y must be in the range j . . . k. By construction
vAlice([xj/m, rA]) ≤ ǫ/10 and vAlice([xk/m,mA]) ≤ ǫ/10. We have yj ≤ xj, since xj is such that
for Bob [j/m, xj/m] is larger than the outside options by more than ǫ/10, while [j/m, yj/m] is
approximately tied with one of [0, j/m] or [yj/m] for Bob. On the other hand, yk ≥ xk since
vBob([k/m, xk/m]) ≤ ǫ/10 < 1/3− ǫ/10 ≤ vBob([k/m, yk/m]).
Suppose we are given a solution xi−1 ≥ yi−1 and xi ≤ yi for the mon−crossing(m) problem
with sequences x and y. The existence of a crossing at index i implies S = [xi, xi−1]∩ [yi−1, yi] 6=
∅. Let z be the maximum element of S. Then xi ≤ z ≤ xi−1 and yi−1 ≤ z ≤ yi.
We claim that cutting at i/m and z/m is an ǫ/2-envy-free solution with respect to the simple
valuations. By the bound on the densities, the choice ofm and of the sequences x and y, we have
that [(i−1)/m, i/m] is worth at most ǫ/10 for both Alice and Bob. Since Alice views the pieces
[0, (i − 1)/m] and [xi−1/m, 1], and [0, i/m] and [xi/m, 1], respectively, as tied within ǫ/10, we
get vAlice([xi−1/m, xi/m]) ≤ 3ǫ/10. For Bob we similarly have vBob([yi−1/m, yi/m]) ≤ 3ǫ/10.
From −ǫ/10 ≤ vAlice([xi/m, 1])−vAlice([0, i/m]) ≤ ǫ/10 and vAlice([z/m, 1]) = vAlice([xi/m, 1])−
vAlice([xi/m, z/m]), we obtain
−4ǫ/10 ≤ −ǫ/10− vAlice([xi/m, z/m]) ≤ vAlice([z/m, 1]) − vAlice([0, i/m])
= vAlice([xi/m, 1]) − vAlice([xi/m, z/m]) − vAlice([0, i/m]) ≤ ǫ/10 − vAlice([xi/m, z/m])
< 4ǫ/10
The pieces [0, i/m] and [z/m, 1] are tied for Alice within 4ǫ/10. Moreover, since Alice values
[i/m, xi/m] for at most 1/3 − ǫ/10, the piece [i/m, z/m] is worth at most 1/3 + 2ǫ/10 to her,
which implies that min{vAlice([0, i/m]), vAlice([z/m, 1])} ≥ vAlice([i/m, z/m]) − 5ǫ/10. Thus
giving Alice one of [0, i/m] or [z/m, 1] would lead to her having envy of at most ǫ/2 for any
other player. For Bob, if the tie is between [i/m, yi/m] and [yi/m, 1], then |vBob([i/m, yi/m])−
vBob([yi/m, 1])| ≤ ǫ/10. From vBob([z/m, yi/m]) ≤ 3ǫ/10, we get that |vBob([i/m, z/m]) −
vBob([z/m, 1])| ≤ 4ǫ/10 and |vBob([i/m, z/m]) − vBob([0, i/m])| ≤ 4ǫ/10. The error term when
Bob’s tie is between [0, i/m] and [i/m, yi/m] is similar, which implies Bob has two largest pieces
tied within ǫ/2, one of which is [i/m, z/m].
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These cuts are revelead to Carol, who chooses her favorite piece among [0, i/m], [i/m, z/m],
and [z/m, 1]. If Carol chooses [0, i/m], then Alice takes [z/m, 1] and Bob [i/m, z/m]. If Carol
chooses [i/m, z/m], Bob takes his favorite from [0, i/m] and [z/m, 1], while Alice gets the re-
maining piece. If Carol chooses [z/m, 1], Alice picks [0, i/m] and Bob [i/m, z/m].
• Case 2: Bob and Carol prefer the piece [rA, 1] to [0, ℓA] and [ℓA, rA] by more than ǫ/2.
Then vBob([rB , 1]) > 1/3, so rA < rB . Alice and Bob compute j = ⌊rA ·m⌋ and k = ⌈rB ·m⌉.
For each i = j . . . k, Alice sets xi as the integer minimizing for her the difference in values between
[0, xi/m] and [xi/m, i/m]. Then |vAlice([0, xi/m])−vAlice([xi/m, i/m])| ≤ ǫ/10 and the sequence
x is weakly increasing since the interval [0, i/m] grows with i. For each i = j . . . k, Bob sets yi
as the integer that equalizes as much as possible for him the piece [i/m, 1] with [0, yi/m]. Then
|vBob([0, yi/m]) − vBob([i/m, 1])| ≤ ǫ/10 and the sequence y is weakly decreasing.
To see why the sequences must cross in the range j . . . k, note that yj ≥ xj since Bob values
[0, xj/m] less than 1/3− ǫ/10 (by ℓA ≤ ℓB) while [0, yj/m] is worth to him at least 1/3− ǫ/10.
We must also show yk ≤ xk. Suppose the opposite holds, yk > xk. Then Bob views the
pieces [0, yk/m], [yk/m, i/m], and [k/m, 1] as equal within ǫ/10. Moreover, Carol cannot prefer
[0, yk/m] to the other pieces by more than ǫ/10, since ℓC > ℓB . Then we can immediately obtain
an ǫ/2-envy-free allocation by letting Carol take her favorite piece between [yk/m, k/m] and
[k/m, 1], giving Alice [0, yk/m] (which is worth to her at least as much as [0, xk/m] and [k/m, 1]),
and Bob the remaining piece. This allocation can be found with O(log ǫ−1) communication
without even the players constructing the sequences. Thus the more difficult case is when
yk ≤ xk. Let Alice and Bob pad their sequences so that x1 = . . . xj−1 = 0 = yk+1 = . . . = ym
and y1 = . . . yj−1 = m = xk+1 = . . . xm.
Suppose we have a solution to themon−crossing(m) problem with xi−1 ≤ yi−1 and xi ≥ yi.
Then S = [xi−1, xi] ∩ [yi, yi−1] 6= ∅. Let z be the maximum element of S. We will obtain an
ǫ/2-envy-free allocation by cutting at z/m and i/m. As in Case 1, Alice and Bob view the
pieces [0, z/m], [z/m, i/m] and [0, z/m], [i/m, 1], respectively, as tied to be the largest within
ǫ/2. Carol is asked for her favorite piece. If Carol selects [0, z/m], Alice takes [z/m, i/m] and
Bob [i/m, 1]. If Carol selects [z/m, i/m], Alice takes [0, z/m] and Bob [i/m, 1]. Otherwise,
Carol takes [i/m, 1], Alice [z/m, i/m] and Bob [0, z/m].
In both cases we obtained an ǫ/2-envy-free allocation for the m-simple valuations, which is
an ǫ-envy-free solution with respect to the real valuations as required.
B Moving Knife Protocols
A moving knife step is a continuous operation that involves several devices moving continuously
across the cake until some stopping condition is met.
Definition 11. (A Moving Knife Step) There are a constant number K of Devices some of
which have a position on the cake and are called Knives and others can have arbitrary real values
and may be called Triggers. The devices are numbered 1 . . . K and each device j is controlled
by a player ij and has a real value xj that changes continuously as time proceeds from α to ω,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ ω ≤ 1. Thus the value of each knife j (i.e. its position on the cake) is given by
some function xj(t) ∈ [0, 1], while the value of each trigger j is given by a function xj(t) ∈ ℜ.
The requirement is that the first device is a knife whose position is equal to the time, while
the value of any additional device j is xj(t) = Fj (t, x1(t), . . . , xj−1(t)). The function Fj may
depend in an arbitrary way on the valuation vij of the player ij controlling the device and on
any outcomes of previous steps of the protocol, but its dependence on the time t and the values
of previous devices x1(t) . . . xj−1(t) is Lipschitz continuous for every hungry valuation vij .
27
An outcome for the moving knife step is the index of a trigger j with different signs at time
α and ω (i.e. where xj(α) ·xj(ω) ≤ 0), together with a time t such that xj(t) = 0, as well as the
values of all devices xj′(t) at that time. (If the value of the trigger xj happens to be monotone
then the time t is unique, but in general there may be different such t and any one of them may
be given.)
We may not always be able to find an exact outcome of a moving knife step with bounded
communication, as the time at which a trigger fires can be irrational for example, so we will
concentrate on obtaining approximate outcomes.
Definition 12 (ǫ-outcome of a moving knife step; see also [BN17]). An ǫ-outcome of a moving
knife step running from time α to ω with devices 1 . . . K is the index of a trigger i that switches
signs from α to ω (i.e. with xi(α) · xi(ω) ≤ 0), together with a time t and approximate values
x˜1(t) . . . x˜K(t) of all the devices at this time, such that
• xi(t) ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ], and
• |x˜j(t)− xj(t)| ≤ ǫ, for all j = 1 . . . K.
Moving knife steps can be simulated approximately in the communication model 14 as fol-
lows.
Theorem B.1. Let M be a moving knife step. Then for all ǫ > 0 and hungry valuations
v1 . . . vn, for every trigger of M that switches signs from the beginning to the end of time that
M runs, there is a communication protocol Mǫ that finds an ǫ-outcome associated with that
trigger using O
(
log ǫ−1
)
rounds each with O
(
log ǫ−1
)
bits of communication.
Proof. Let the moving knife step run from time α to ω with devices 1 . . . K. Since the de-
pendence functions of the devices are α-Lipschitz, for some constant α, the number of devices
is constant, it follows that there exists a constant ζ > max{1, α} such that for any device
i = 1 . . . K and times s < t, where s, t ∈ [α, ω],
|xi(t)− xi(s)| ≤ ζ · |t− s|. (1)
Let M = K + 1 be the maximum number of arguments of any function Fi. First, given
ǫ > 0 and time t, we note there exist approximate values x˜1(t) . . . x˜K(t) with O(log ǫ
−1) bits of
all the devices at this time, such that |x˜i(t) − xi(t)| ≤ ǫ/
(
(4 · ζ)K−i
√
MK−i
)
for each device
i. For the first device this holds since the device is a knife with position equal to the time t,
and so there is x˜1(t) ∈ [0, 1] with O(log ǫ−1) bits such that |x˜1(t)− t| ≤ ǫ/
(
(4 · ζ)K−1
√
MK−1
)
.
Suppose the condition holds for devices 1 . . . s− 1.
We have the inequalities:
|Fs (t, x1(t), . . . , xs−1(t))− Fs (t, x˜1(t), . . . , x˜s−1(t))|
≤ ζ · || (t, x1(t), . . . , xs−1(t))− (t, x˜1(t), . . . , x˜s−1(t)) ||2
≤ ζ ·
√
M · ǫ
2 · 4K−s · ζK−s+1
√
MK−s+1
=
ǫ
2 · (4 · ζ)K−s
√
MK−s
14We note that this simulation may find a time that is in fact far from the time where the trigger becomes
exactly zero. This is unlike the RW model, where we can maintain the values of the devices with infinite precision,
case in which for any point in time t the values x1(t) . . . xK(t) are known exactly. Nevertheless, the moving knife
protocols from the literature work for both notions of approximation.
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Then player is controlling the device can report a value x˜s(t) with O(log ǫ
−1) bits such that
|x˜s(t) − Fs (t, x˜1(t), . . . , x˜s−1(t)) | ≤ ǫ
2·(4·ζ)K−s
√
MK−s
. The correct value of device s at time t is
xs(t) = Fs (t, x1(t), . . . , xs−1(t)); we obtain |x˜s(t) − xs(t)| ≤ ǫ
(4·ζ)K−s
√
MK−s
as required. Thus
|x˜i(t)− xi(t)| ≤ ǫ for each time t and device i.
To find a time when trigger j’s value is approximate zero, we will construct a protocol that
maintains throughout the search two points in time at which the trigger has different signs.
We are assured that xj(α) · xj(ω) ≤ 0, so initialize s = α and t = ω. By previous arguments,
player ij can report x˜j(s) and x˜j(t) with O(log ǫ
−1) bits such that |x˜j(t′) − xj(t′)| ≤ ǫ/2, for
t′ = s, t. If x˜j(t′) ∈ [−ǫ/2, ǫ/2] for some t′ ∈ {s, t}, then xj(t′) ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ], so the time t′ is
a correct solution that can be output together with the values x˜1(t
′) . . . x˜K(t′). Otherwise,
x˜j(t
′) 6∈ [−ǫ/2, ǫ/2] for t′ = s, t, which implies that xj(s), xj(t) 6∈ [−ǫ, ǫ]. In this case the
product x˜j(s) · x˜j(t) has the same sign as xj(s) ·xj(t), and we can check the midpoint (s+ t)/2.
If x˜j(s) ∈ [−ǫ/2, ǫ/2], return (s + t)/2. Otherwise, continue the search in the interval between
[s, (s + t)/2] and [(s + t)/2, t] where x˜j switches signs. If a solution has not been found after
2ζ/ǫ steps, stop and return the time s. Note that since |α − ω| ≤ 1, after 2ζ/ǫ steps we have
|s − t| ≤ ǫ/(2ζ), and so |xi(s) − xi(t)| ≤ ζ · |s − t| ≤ ǫ/2. Moreover, we are guaranteed by the
condition maintained throughout the search that xi switches signs in [s, t], thus x˜i(s) ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ]
and the time s is a correct approximation obtained using O(log ǫ−1) rounds each with O(log ǫ−1)
bits of communication.
Note that even if the players have simple valuations, we may not be able to simulate exactly
moving knife steps with very complex dependence functions. For example, a moving knife step
K may be such that on some instances the only time when a trigger fires is an irrational point,
case in which the simulation in the communication model is bound to return an approximate
time. The moving knife step may be further embedded in a moving knife protocol with if
branches checking whether K was executed exactly or only approximately, and with radically
different allocations in the two scenarios. Thus we will require from moving knife protocols that
they remain robust when the answers of the players are only approximately correct.
Definition 13 (Moving Knife Protocol). A moving knife protocolM consists of a finite number
of steps 1 . . . K, where the outcome of the kth step is denoted by Rk and represents either
• any real number that a player can output as a function of its own valuation, or
• the outcome of a moving knife step
and in both cases may additionally depend on the history, i.e. on outcomes R1 . . . Rk−1 of the
previous steps. At the end of each execution, M outputs an allocation of the cake that depends
on the outcomes of the steps it executed.
We also require robustness: if M outputs F-fair allocations, then for all ǫ > 0, by iteratively
replacing each outcome Rk of step k = 1 . . . K of M with an ǫ-outcome R˜k, M still outputs
ǫ-F-fair partitions and runs in K steps.
It is easy to observe that the existing moving knife protocols (see, e.g., [RW98]) are robust.
Theorem 3.2 (restated). Let M be any moving knife protocol that runs in constantly many
steps and outputs F-fair partitions. Then for every ǫ > 0, there is a communication protocol Mǫ
that uses O(log ǫ−1) rounds each with O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication and outputs ǫ-F-fair
partitions.
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Proof. Let each player i make its valuation hungry, if it is not already, by setting v′i(x) =
(1− ǫ/2) · vi(x) + ǫ/2 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, set v′i = vi.
Consider the following protocol Mǫ, which follows the execution of M on valuations v′i as
follows. For each step k of M, given approximate outcomes R˜1 . . . R˜k−1 of the previous steps:
• if step k requires some player i to output a number, the player can communicate an
ǫ
2r -approximation, R˜k, of the exact number it has computed with O(log ǫ
−1) bits of com-
munication.
• if step k is a moving knife step, then Mǫ can set R˜k to an ǫ2r -outcome of the step with
O(log ǫ−1) rounds of O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication.
By the robustness of the protocol, the allocation obtained is ǫ/2-F-fair with respect to valuations
v′i. Since F is an abstract fairness notion and the valuations v′i are ǫ/2 close to vi, this allocation
is ǫ-F-fair with respect to the original valuations vi as required.
We obtain the following simulations for the known moving knife procedures.
Corollary 5. Austin’s procedure for computing a perfect allocation between two players, the
Barbanel-Brams, Stromquist, and Webb procedures for computing an envy-free allocation with
connected pieces among n = 3 players, and the moving knife step for computing an equitable
allocation for any fixed number n of players [BN17, SHS17] can be simulated using O(log ǫ−1)
rounds each with O(log ǫ−1) bits of communication for all ǫ > 0.
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